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THE MARCH OF WAR IN NORTH AFRICA
W HEN the Allies invaded French NorthAfrica. in November 1942, they were
not quick enough to frustrate Axis
countermeasures. Slowed down by a lack
of supplies on the one hand, and by in-
efficiency and indecision on the other, the
British First Army, under General Anderson,
which had moved eaatwa.rd along the Mediter-
ranean coast, was stopped by German and
Italian formations. These latter had been
transported to Tunisia by air, and while
consolidating their position in a narrow
circle in the northeastern part of the country,
they had taken up strong defense positions
whence they were able to repulse the at-
tackers.
Simultaneous with these operations, Axis
forces had pushed southward from Tunis
and northward from Tripolitania, thus secur-
ing the entire coastal strip of eastern Tunisia,
with its strategic ports and communication
lines, against the attempts of French dis-
sident troops advancing towards Kairouan
and American detachments operating from
T"t-a wWlIonle ceulallol IIoml l5uuLlleCll TUlli·
aia.
During the following weeks both sides
Wl!re bUSy organ.tzIng theIr communications.
A stream of reinforcements went acr088 the
straits between sout~em Italy and Tunisia
to bolster the fighting strength of the Axis.
Both the opposing air forces were active,
bombin~ 8upply bases and contesting for air
superiority, which so far seems to have
rcwa.iucd witll the Axill.
ARNIM AND ROMMEL
Gradually the area. held by the Gennan
forces in the north was expanded. better
positions being gained, notably by the
capture of Tebourba and the advance on
Medjez el Bab. Strengthened by armored
detachments, the Axis forces in Tunisia were
placed under· the command of General von
Arnim who, on January 18, captured Pont
du Fahs and pursued the French in that
sector in a southwesterly direction along the
Kebir River, at the same time preB8ing
towards some of the passes north of Bou
Arada. Further south, fighting flared up
between Kairouan and Pichon, leading to a
retreat on the part of the French defenders.
This phase of the battle lasted until January
24 and netted the Axis troops a booty of
21 tanks, 70 guus, 200 trucks, and plenty of
other material captured, as well as some
4,000 prisoners.
While this was happening in Tunisia,
Marshal Rommel continued to withdraw his'
army weatward, ev~ding all outflanking
maneuvers of the British Eighth Army under
General Montgomery. He evacuated Trip-
olis, which was o,-,cupied by the British on
January 23, and finally took up positions in
the Mareth Line. This system of fortifica-
tions is roughly fifty miles long. It is
situated between the Gulf of Gabes and the
Shott el Jerid and was constructed by the
French. While Marshal Rommel's rear
guards were fighting a delaying action south
of this line, his main body of troops strength-
ened the fortifications already in existence.
At that time Allied estimates figured the
strength of the Axis forces in Tunisia at
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around 160,000 to ISO,OOO men, ll! against
200.000 Anglo-Amcrican t roors cx Imling
thc French dissident detachments.
THE AXIS Pl"'HE' WE.'T
Another pha c of the battle began at the
end of Janus.ry, when an important pass
ea~t of Sidi bou Zid, on the road between
•'fax and Sbeitla, was captured by Axis
forcl' . u,' weU as the cit\" of •'cned on the
'fax G fsa railway, C-ontinued pre urc of
the Axis then led to the capture of Sidi bou
Zid Gnfsa, Kll8serine and Metlaoui, (Feb-
ruary Ii). Exploit.ing their llueee8.'*lS, the
-Germans advane d along the northwestern
shore of the 'hott el Jerid beyond Tozeur
to Nefta, and also from Ka.<lserine in 0. north.
erly direction towards Thala, occupying
Sbeitla nnd Feril1na, which had been evac-
uated by the Americans. Allied report",
sho"ing great alarm, were already speaking
of a threat to the Americlln base of opera·
tionA, t.he city of Tebessa, and British troops
were diHpatched from northern TuniRia to
support the Allied front on the central and
southern sectors, when t he Germans stopped
their aJ\'ancc on February 25. In this
(!rive, the Axis forces took 4,015 prisoners
an I apt.ured or destroyed 235 tanks, 169
armored cars, 160 guns and gun carriages,
one ammunition depot, 15 planes, and m&Dy
trucks and other war booty. After tbat,
the Germans withdrew again from Feriana,
K888Crine, Sbeitla, Gafsa, and aU districts
~t~th~~~,to~~up~~~ns
particularly favorable for defense.
Hardly had these operations in central
und western Tuni1!ia been complE'ted, when
the Axis st.aged l~ successful thrust in the
north rn part of the country. After having
gained b'Tound near Mcdjez el Bab anu Beja,
the Axis forces reachcd COli beUat, north of
Bou Arildll, at the end of Fl~bruary. On
Mar 'h 7, a spearhead ad nlllcing along the
c-oa t captured Cnpc ·em~t. Sedj nane,
south of Cape Serrat, had been evacuated by
the British shortly before.
SITUATIOS [X THE 0 TH
Meanwhile the first mobile units of the
British Eightb Army had crossed the frontier
betwecn Li bya and Tuni1!ia on February 7.
Geneml Montgomery's outflanking man livers
were invariably foiled. but by February 20
the British were establitlhed in the area
between Medenin and Foum-Tataollin,
when e they cautiously maul' rcconnoitering
. 0rti<'8 against the ~tareth Lint', On March
{i the Axis force lallnched a . urprise
RUnck again. t this area of deployment
which "icldcd valuable information on tho
Brit ish' plans. By the middle of Marclt.
t he real ·tl'llggle on this front had not yet
(·ommenced. but there were sign.'! that the
British wcr prcparing for a major attack.
The withdmwal of Marshal RommeJ'R
army from Lib)ll coupled with the Axis
offensives in cent.ral and southern Tllni"ill
have permitted aU Axis troops on African
. oil to join hands in that French colony
and to concentrate their entire strength in
n country with excellent natural possibilities
for defen. e or attack and with II highly
dt'vcloped system of railway and ronds.
FTH."1' TE'!T FOH AMERlC ..\N'!
The fighting in Tunisia gave the American
Fifth Army its first chance to pro\'e ita mettle
against German and italian troops. It W88
al."o the first hance for the newly appointed
American commander in chief of all Allied
force in North Africa, General Eieenhower,
to how his qualities in more than just an
occupation ~ practically undefended areas.
Neither he nor his American troops have
stood the test too well. The Britisb, who
had 80 often been t-old by people from the
other side of the Atlantic how the war ought
to be conducted, were even a little malicious
in tbeir comments. The English journalist
Cummings in the Ne'U'8 Chronicle cttlled the
American troops "greenllOrns" and suggested
that the American officcnl were chiefly to
blame for the Jack of good training methods
and sufficient techn.ical knowledge. Genera.l
Catroux, .French di8.'lident leader, regarded
the setback sutTered by the Americans &8 a
"major defeat"; and Reuter's spe<:ial cor·
respondent with the British First Army,
Hllig Nicholson, revealed that, according t,o
letters found in the battle area, German
soldiers consider service on the Tunisian
front agai.nst the Anglo.American fo~ as
a "picnic" compared to the fighting in
RUAsiu..
The Americans themselves did not agree
on the reasons. The US Secretan' of War
Stimson said at a press conference' that tbis
defeat was not unexpected, inasmuch as the
Am rican positions in cent ral Tuni ia had
been weak. ContrarY to this declaration,
the Yew YorIo Herald~ Tribllne was unable to
understand why Gent'ral Eisenhower, in
spite of his RI~perior forces in men and
material. had failed to pre\'(~nt the German
SIl('('('SS('S. .' nator John H. Bankhead.
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Democrat from Alabama, blamed inadequate
and ineffective equipment for the setback;
but General Sommerwell, {;S Chief of Army
Supplies who had just returned from an
inspection tour in North Africa, denied this
('harge, without, however, coming forward
wit'h llny other reasons.
THE GEXERALS
~earest to reality, perhaps, came the
"'ew York Timu, which commented that
..he first reason was t,o be found in • political
l:1<luabbles over fictitious issues which deflect
attention from the immediate military task,"
and the second reason in the "need for
American troopil to get battle experience,
which can only be done by fighting." While
the latter needs no amplification, it may be
pertinent to point out with regard to the
former that seasoned British generals have,
e\'idently for political considerations, been
subordinated to General Eisenhower. It is
interesting to note that one of the first
measures taken by the British General
Al xander, the K-'Cond·in·command of the
Allied troops in North Africa, was to sep-
arate the British troops from the American
and French ones, all of whom will henceforth
fight 8ep&rately.
The German annies in Tunisia are under
the commanda of Marshal Rommel (who is
directing operations in the southern and
central part of the country) and General
von Arnim (who is holding the northern
SEdor). Both are, of coune, co.ordinating
their strategy. They are faced in the north
by the British Pint Army under General
Andt'rson; in the center by the American
f'ifth Army under General Carr, with French
dissident troops interspersed in this sector;
and in the south by the British Eighth Army
under General Montgomery. To the north.
west of the great BaIt lakes, French forces
under the de Gaullist General Le Clerc, who
marched with his men through the Sahara
from Lake Chad, apparently form the link
between the British Eighth Army and the
American Fifth Army.
During the fighting of the past few months
a number of l''rench soldiers in the Allied
ranks were taken prisoner. As many of
them had been forced into Allied service,
the Axis is not treat.ing these men as prison.
ers of war but is 8ending them back to their
homes in France or Tunisia. Reports from
both camps confirm that the fighting morale
of the French troops is, on the whole, pretty
low. This is not surprising in view of the
quarrels between various French factions,
especially between Giraud and de Gaulle
and their respective backers. A large num-
ber of Frenchmen have already reached
their homes.
• • •
More than four months have pa.ased since
the Anglo-American invlUIion of North Africa.
which WlUl heralded by the Allies lUI the
"turning point of tbe war." So far the
results of this effort have been rather meager.
Our assumption that it would prove mueh
easier for the Allies to land their troops in
North Africa than to keep them supplied blUl
turned out to be correct, thanks to the
efficiency demonstrated by Axis submarines
and planes in their attacks upon the Anglo.
American routes of supply.
